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Abstract 
 Primates as a taxonomic Order have the largest brains corrected for body size in 
the animal kingdom.   These large brains have allowed primates to evolve the capacity to 
demonstrate advanced cognitive processes across a wide array of abilities.  Nonhuman 
primates are particularly adept at social learning, defined as the modification of behavior 
by observing the actions of others.   Additionally, primates often exploit resources 
differently depending on their social context.  In this study, capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella) were tested on a cognitive task in three social contexts to determine if social 
context influenced their performance on the task.  The three social contexts included: 
alone, having a dominant individual in an adjacent compartment, and having a 
subordinate individual in the adjacent compartment.  The benefits to this design were that 
the social context was the only variable influencing performance, whereas in previous 
studies investigating audience effects other animals could physically and directly 
influence a subject’s performance in an open testing situation.  Based on past studies, I 
predicted that the presence of a dominant individual would reduce cognitive task 
performance compared to the other conditions.  The cognitive test used was a match-to-
sample discrimination task in which animals matched combinations of eight geometric 
shapes.  Animals were trained on this task in an isolated context until they reached a 
baseline level of proficiency and were then tested in the three social contexts in a random 
order multiple times.  Two subjects (Mt and Dv) have successfully completed trials under 
all conditions.  Results indicated that there were no significant difference in task 
performance across the three conditions (Dv χ2 (1) = 0.42, p=0.58; Mt χ2 (1) = 0.02, 
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p=0.88).  In all conditions, subjects performed significantly above chance (i.e., 39/60 
trials determined by a binomial distribution).  Results are contrary to previous studies that 
report low status monkeys “play dumb” when testing in a mixed social context, possibly 
because other studies did not account for aggressive interference by dominants while 
testing.  Results of this study suggest that the mere presence of a dominant individual 
does not necessarily affect performance on a cognitive task, but rather the imminence of 
physical aggression is the most important factor influencing testing in a social context.   
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Introduction 
 
  Nonhuman primates demonstrate advanced cognitive processes across a wide 
array of abilities including the ability to use tools (e.g., Phillips 1998; Sugiyama 1994), to 
order quantities (e.g., Judge, Evans, & Vyas 2005), and even to learn human-like 
languages such as the symbolic word system used by bonobos, Pan panisicus (Savage-
Rumbaugh, McDonald, Sevcik, Hopkins, & Rubert 1986).  Some theories suggest that 
primates have developed their advanced cognitive abilities due to their sociality (Dunbar 
1992; Byrne & Corp 2004). Primates, as a taxonomic Order, have the largest relative 
brain and neocortex size corrected for body size (Dunbar 1995).  Further, there is a strong 
positive correlation between brain and neocortex size and group size, implying that more 
social animals evolved the capacity for higher intelligence (see Perez-Barberia, Shultz, & 
Dunbar 2007 for a review). One theory that attempts to explain why social complexity 
and brain size are positively correlated is the “Machiavellian Intelligence Theory” (Byrne 
& Whiten 1988).  The Machiavellian Intelligence Theory proposes that since most 
primates live in unpredictable environments with patchy, highly contested resources, an 
“evolutionary arms-race” is established between group members.  In this “arms-race,” 
individuals “win” by deceiving conspecifics so that they acquire a desired resource, such 
as mates or food.  Additionally, individuals who are able to deceive social partners 
without the “loser” being made aware of their loss would be highly selected for since this 
deception can occur with minimal damage to group cohesion (Byrne & Whiten 1997).  
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However, this theory posits that primates evolved larger brains with increasing group size 
to deal with the complexities of having to outsmart more group members in larger groups.   
  The interpretation that brain evolution is driven by the constant motivation for 
greater strategies and counterstrategies to deceive conspecifics has also received criticism 
(e.g., Seyfarth & Cheyney 2002) because it usually assumes a level of consciousness that 
is higher than the capacity of most primates demonstrate.  Another explanation for the 
relationship between social complexity and brain size is the Social Brain Hypothesis 
(Dunbar 2009), which suggests that primates are constantly participating in a “biological 
market,” with, “animals as traders engaged in a mutually beneficial exchange of 
commodities,” such as when baboons (Papio hamadryas ursinus) or chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) groom for access to other valued commodities (Barrett, Henzi, & Dunbar 
2003).  This hypothesis posits that, since primates in larger groups have more possible 
“traders” to interact with, these animals have evolved larger brains to monitor a larger 
and more complex market with changing traders and variable commodity values.  Thus, 
the gregarious tendency of primates is driving evolutionary selection for larger, more 
intelligent brains.   
 Social Interaction and Social Knowledge 
 Originally, primate social systems were thought to have evolved due to benefits 
derived from group living, such as collective predator defense, enhanced predator 
detection, foraging efficiency and shared defense from other species and conspecific 
groups of valuable resources such as food, territory, and mates (Strier 2007).  Tomasello 
and Call (1997) discuss the complexities of primate “social fields” within such groups, 
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and argue that a social field is similar to the spatial fields in which all animals live and 
interact.  Social fields require the presence of four components: individuals specifically 
recognize other individuals in their group, individuals understand and can predict (to 
some extent) behavior of other individuals, animals form direct relationships with group 
members by remembering past experiences with those individuals, and individuals 
recognize and remember interactions that other individuals have had with each other.   
 There is extensive evidence for individual recognition.  For example, tufted 
capuchins (Cebus apella) are able to recognize facial pictures of group mates (Pokorny & 
de Waal 2009).  Squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus macrodon) are able to recognize 
individual calls of group mates and respond differentially to playback calls of group 
mates compared to playback calls of neighboring groups or strangers (Biben & Symmes 
1991).  Studies have also demonstrated the ability of primates to predict the behavior of 
other individuals in their group.  For example, in the 1970s, Menzel conducted work with 
a group of captive chimpanzees in which experimenters would hide food in an outdoor 
compound while the animals were locked inside.  However, one individual was allowed 
to watch the hiding process.  Eventually the chimps learned to identify the “watcher” and 
predict where the food was located by his movements (Menzel 1979).  Further, there are 
many studies that have demonstrated individual recognition leading to direct relationship 
formation.  The majority of this evidence has come from studies of kin selection where a 
crucial factor is the ability to recognize and interact selectively with relatives.  For 
example, Charpentier, Peignot, Hossaert-McKey, and Wickings, (2007) have 
demonstrated that mandrills (Mandrillus sphinx) selectively affiliate with maternal and 
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paternal half-siblings significantly more often than non-relatives. Finally, there is 
extensive evidence that primates are able to discriminate relationships between two 
others.  For example, during “redirected aggression” an individual who is the victim in an 
aggressive encounter may retaliate against their aggressor’s kin or associates (e.g., pigtail 
macaques, Macaca neminstrina, Judge 1982; vervet monkeys, Cercopithecus aethiops 
Cheyney & Seyfarth 1989) indicating that primates not only recognize the individuals 
involved in a conflict, but know the relationships these combatants share with others.  
Further, Judge (1991) found that pigtail macaques engage in triadic reconciliation, in 
which the kin of victims in a fight will reconcile with their kin’s aggressor, suggesting 
that these animals are both recognizing third party relations and predicting others’ 
behavior based on their actions. Finally, Bachmann (2009) has demonstrated that captive 
hamadryas baboons (Papio hamadryas hamadryas) who witness a fight decrease 
behavioral indicators stress when they witness reconciliation between former combatants, 
where  reconciliation is defined as the friendly post-conflict reunion between former 
opponents that functions as conflict resolution (de Waal & van Roosmalen 1979).  The 
results indicated that primates are able to track rapid changes in the relationships between 
two other individuals, since the baboons quickly altered their behavior as the relationship 
between two combatants changed.    
 Social Learning 
  Clearly, there is extensive evidence for the four components of the primate “social 
field” (Tomasello and Call 1997).  However, the existence of a primate social field does 
not confer an adaptive advantage unless primates can exploit the field to their advantage.  
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Social learning is one means that primates exploit this social field.  Fragaszy and 
Visalberghi (2004) define social learning as the modification of behavior through 
experience, whereby an animal gains information about stimulus-response contingencies 
by observing the actions of others.  One of the earliest documented cases of social 
learning was seen in the Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) at Koshima, Japan (Kawai 
1965). The researchers provided the monkeys with sweet potatoes on the beach on a 
regular basis.  Initially, an 18-month old was the first and only troop member to wash her 
potato pieces free of sand in the nearby ocean, but within three months her mother and 
two playmates also began to wash their potatoes.  Within two years almost half the troop 
engaged in the behavior. These observations generated interest in social learning and the 
possibility of cultural transmission.   
Since the early Koshima studies, several types of social learning have been 
documented and in a variety of primate species.  For example, Tarnaud and Yamagiwa 
(2008) found in Japanese macaques that infants preferentially watch older group 
members to learn what foods are best to eat and how to process them.  Specifically, 
infants were preferentially watching their mothers and sub-adult females, as opposed to 
juveniles or adult males, and these mothers and sub-adult females were foraging 
significantly on fruits, leaves, and invertebrates.  The highest time of intensive 
observation by the infants was during the weaning period when mothers were limiting 
suckling time and infants were forced to explore the environment for new food items.  
Further, Humle, Snowdon, and Matsuzawa (2009) demonstrated that wild chimpanzee 
mothers preferentially use tools to fish for ants at certain time periods and locations that 
12 
 
maximize infant learning.  The chimpanzee mothers engaged in low-risk foraging on 
trails rather than high-risk foraging at ant-nests to reduce the possibility of swarming.  
The timing and location allowed infants to have a longer observation and practice period. 
Further, they demonstrated that the longer the mother spent showing the infant ant-
dipping behavior, the more the offspring spent later engaging in the behavior itself.  
Many studies investigating social learning demonstrate that specific relationships 
between two individuals, particularly mother-offspring and kin, influence infant learning.  
However, cultural transmission of another species’ behavior has also been documented.  
In a study by de Waal and Johanowicz (1993), the authors investigated whether the 
reconciliation behavior of one species could be influenced by members of a different 
species.   De Waal and Johanowicz (1993) studied a group of rhesus macaques (Macaca 
mulatta) co-housed with stumptail macaques (Macaca arctoides).  In general, rhesus 
macaques are a highly aggressive species with a low reconciliation rate and low social 
tolerance, while stumptail macaques are a highly social tolerant species, reconciling 
frequently following aggression. The authors demonstrated that the rhesus macaques 
learned social tolerance and reconciled with each other three times more often than 
control individuals not housed with stumptail macaques.  They concluded that cultural 
transmission of the stumptail macaque tendency to reconcile more and show a higher 
social tolerance had been passed on to the rhesus macaques. Additionally, Whiten, 
Horner, and de Waal (2005) demonstrated that a particular solution to a tool use 
apparatus with two different solutions was transmitted through two chimpanzee groups 
by cultural transmission.  In this study, the authors designed a tool use task that could be 
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solved by one of two methods.  They then trained one high ranking female from each of 
two separate groups to be a “model,” but both models learned different ways of solving 
the task. Then the rest of the group watched the model perform the task and was given the 
task to perform themselves.  Members of both groups significantly adopted their models’ 
method (i.e., performed their models method statistically more often than the alternative 
method).  Interestingly, the authors noted that some individuals independently discovered 
the alternative method, but continued to reliably perform their group’s method, which the 
authors interpreted to be “cultural conformity.”   
Tomasello and Call (1997) point out that during social learning primates do not 
usually imitate a response or teach another individual about a stimulus response 
contingency.  Often, when individuals learn from others, stimulus or local enhancement 
draws other group members to use the same stimuli, but not necessarily to emulate the 
exact behavior with full understanding. For example, Call and Tomasello (1994) taught 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) to use a rake to obtain out of reach food but the rake could 
be used in two different ways, one of which was more appropriate depending on the 
experimental context.  These orangutans were then used as models for their group mates 
to watch.  While many of the group members attempted to use the rake they saw the 
models using, no subject was reliably able to emulate the correct method in the correct 
experimental condition.  So, while imitative social learning was thought to be a 
widespread phenomenon, there was also evidence that less complex cognitive processes 
such as stimulus enhancement (attraction to a certain stimulus) or local enhancement 
(attraction to a certain location to perform a behavior) were occurring. However, for the 
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purposes of this study, what is most relevant is that individuals alter their behavior after 
observing other group members altering or exploiting the environment to advantageous 
ends.  
 Coordinated Behavior 
  Another way that primates adjust their behavior to others is to coordinate behavior 
in order to meet a goal that would be much more difficult, if not impossible, if performed 
in a solitary context.  One of the most common occurrences of coordinated behavior is 
seen in the formation of coalitions and alliances.  De Waal and Harcourt (1992) define 
ethological coalitions and alliances as, “a joining of forces of several parties in order to 
gain an advantage over another party.” The general idea is that individuals are 
cooperating in order to gain a competitive advantage in a direct competition against 
others (de Waal & Harcourt 1992).  There is extensive evidence of coalitions and 
alliances forming among all four ape species, virtually all cercopithecine primates, 
(Tomasello & Call 1997), and even some New World species (e.g., tufted capuchins 
Ferreira, Izar, & Lee 2006).  Coalitions and alliances can form for a variety of reasons, 
and can vary greatly in their duration.  Indeed, many primates have developed 
stereotyped behaviors that are directed at group members in order to solicit their help in 
agonistic situations (see Walters & Seyfarth 1987 for a review).  For example, Silk, 
Alberts, and Altmann (2004) report that female savannah baboons (Papio hamadryas 
cynocephalus) provide coalitionary support to solicitations in approximately 5% of 
aggressive interactions, with kin members and higher ranking females solicited most 
often.  Kin members are motivated to provide support in aggressive encounters because 
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of kin selection, while high ranking females are motivated to provide support because 
they risk losing benefits of a gregarious lifestyle if the lower ranking females leave the 
group. This pattern of coalition formation can be seen in nearly every cercopithecine as 
well as the great apes (de Waal & Harcourt 1982).  
  Another form of coordinated behavior seen in the wild is hunting behavior in 
chimpanzees. Boesch (2002) reports on the variation and type of hunting seen in different 
chimpanzee groups in the Tai National Forest, Côte d’Ivoire.  In his observations, Boesch 
reports that various chimpanzee groups have developed coordinated hunting parties in 
which members assume different roles such as ambusher, chaser, blocker, and driver.  
The hunts usually require the specificity of all these roles, as well as anticipation of prey 
movements. Only males participate in hunting parties, beginning at age 10, but do not 
develop sophisticated skills until after approximately 20 years of practice (i.e., age 30).  
The amount of meat shared is proportional to the effort and role invested in the hunt.  The 
Tai hunts are successful approximately half of the time and are more complex than hunts 
reported in other chimpanzee populations.  For example, the hunts observed in the 
Gombe forest rarely have the specified roles seen in the Tai hunting parties and usually 
just involve a group ambushing a prey item (see Boesch 2002 for a review).  Regardless 
of job specificity and coordination, groups are more likely to cooperatively hunt only if it 
increases the chances of a successful prey capture (Boesch 1994).  
  There is evidence for naturally occurring coordinated behavior in other Old World 
primates and apes, and even in prosimians such as the coordinated group movements of 
sifakas, Propithecus verreauxi (Trillmich, Fichtel, & Kappeler 2004).   Much laboratory 
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evidence indicates that many primates are able to cooperate on a task, although the 
degrees to which they understand the role of other individuals in the task is quite variable.  
For example, Chalmeau, Lardeux, Brandibas, and Gallo (1997) report that two 
orangutans were able to perform a coordinated task without being trained to work 
together.  The task required that two levers be pulled simultaneously in order to obtain 
food, but the levers were too far apart to for one individual to pull both.  The orangutans 
demonstrated an untrained understanding of the requirements of this task and the authors 
concluded that they were similar to chimpanzees in their ability to engage in coordinated 
behavior without explicit training, such as the behaviors chimpanzees display while 
hunting.  Coordination has also been seen in a variety of monkey species.   Mason and 
Hollis (1962) trained rhesus macaques to operate a mechanism that pulled food rewards 
towards both individuals in the pair.  The task had four levers each connected to a pair of 
food trays, only one of which contained food.  The food dishes were visually occluded so 
that only one individual in the pair could see the food and only the other individual in the 
pair could operate the pulley to bring the food rewards to the pair.  Therefore, the “seer” 
had to inform the “puller” as to the location of the food.  The macaques were able to learn 
this task, but unable to reverse roles without further training.  A similar result occurred in 
a study with tufted capuchin monkeys (Chalmeau, Visalberghi, & Gallo 1997).  The task 
was similar to the lever task for the orangutans described above.  However, the capuchins 
required training in order to coordinate their behavior and did not seem to understand the 
role of the other individual in the task.  Therefore, these and other studies lead to the 
conclusion that monkeys are able to coordinate their behavior, but do not fully understand 
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cooperative problem solving. Regardless of the level of understanding, the primates are 
adjusting their behavior in the presence of other individuals.  
 Deception 
  Another area of primate behavior that involves a context specific alteration of 
behavior toward another is seen in the phenomenon of deception.  There are a myriad of 
anecdotes providing evidence that primates are able to deceive conspecifics.  For 
example, de Waal (1998) reports observing a low ranking male chimpanzee hiding his 
erection from higher ranking males while soliciting a female.  Also, Van Elsacker, 
Meuleman, and Savini (2001) describe an incident in which an adult male bonobo hid 
preferred food items in an indoor enclosure.  He would not start to eat these highly prized 
items until after the other adult male started eating in the presence of the higher ranking 
females.  These higher ranking females would pester the male who was eating in their 
presence and often took his food.  The authors concluded that hiding the valued items and 
waiting until the females were distracted was evidence of tactical deception.   
  There are also many reports of deceptive behavior in monkeys, particularly in 
capuchin monkeys (see Fujita, Kuroshima, & Masuda 2002).  For example, Wheeler 
(2009) reports that wild tufted capuchins use alarm calls in a deceptive manner, which he 
referred to as the “monkeys crying wolf.”  Alarm calls exist in many primate species and 
are specific vocalizations that alert conspecifics to the presence of predators.  Alarm calls 
can result in a variety of anti-predator behaviors such as freezing or moving to out-of-
sight locations (Zuberbuhler, Noe, & Seyfarth 1997; Zuberbuhler 2002).  However, false 
alarm calls can be valuable if they succeed in distracting dominant individuals from 
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foraging. The author predicted that if calls were used in this manner, the subordinate 
monkeys would give false alarm calls more often than dominant monkeys because they 
have more limited access to food.    Wheeler (2009) observed that calls did succeed in 
distracting dominant individuals, they were given significantly more when food was most 
highly contested in areas of high animal density, and that the false alarm callers were in a 
spatial position where the call facilitated usurpation of the available resources.  Wheeler 
concluded that subordinate individuals selectively altered their alarm calling behavior 
depending on the specific social context to maximize resource consumption.  
  Amici, Call, and Aureli (2009) tested three species of monkeys to determine the 
amount of deception the species exhibited, if any, and under what conditions. The authors 
presented spider monkeys (Ateles geoffroyi), tufted capuchins, and long-tailed macaques 
(Macaca fascicularis) with two tasks.  In each task, subordinate individuals were trained 
to perform the task while dominant individuals were not.  The first task involved an 
opaque box that had a reward hidden inside.  The second task involved a clear box which 
allowed the reward to be seen by both individuals, but only the subordinate individual 
was informed on how to open the box.  The results showed that the subordinates of all 
three species often waited to open the box until dominant individuals were further away 
or not looking, indicating that they were able to withhold information from dominant 
individuals.  
  In all of the deceptive situations described above, a distinct and purposeful change 
in behavior occurred due to the presence of other individuals, particularly dominant 
individuals. Subordinates changed their behavior in specific contexts in a predictable 
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manner both experimentally (e.g., Amici, Call, & Aureli 2009), and under naturalistic 
conditions (e.g., Wheeler 2009; de Waal 1998). 
 Audience Effects 
  Although it is fairly well established that primates change their behavior in a 
context specific manner, the systematic study of “audience effects” is a relatively new 
line of research that did not emerge until the late 1990s.  Some research comes from the 
detrimental effects of high visitor density on zoo animals. For example, Wells (2005) 
reports that in a group of zoo-housed western lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) 
the animals exhibit significantly more behavioral indicators of stress, including 
conspecific aggression, abnormal behavior (such as repetitive teeth clenching, body 
rocking, or spinning), and autogrooming, during periods of high visitor density.  Hosey 
(2000) reports similar results in a review of a variety of New World monkey, Old World 
monkey, and ape behavior in zoos.  In contrast, during periods of low visitor density the 
animals exhibited significantly more normative behaviors indicative of relaxation.  
  Two studies that systematically studied how audience composition affected 
vocalizations were done by Pollick, Gouzoules, and de Waal (2005) on capuchins and 
Slocombe and Zuberbuhler (2007) on chimpanzees.  In the capuchin study, the authors 
investigated how food calling varied during different social contexts.  The authors 
predicted that capuchins would adjust their food vocalizations based on both the amount 
of food and the composition of their audience.  The test involved 12 adult females under 
two food conditions (small amount and large amount)  and five total audience conditions 
(higher ranking female, higher ranking male, lower ranking female, lower ranking male, 
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whole group, and solitary).  The results indicated that subjects called more for large 
amounts of food than for small amounts, and that high ranking subjects called 
significantly less often than middle or low ranking individuals.  Further, there were 
significantly more calls made in the presence of the whole group than for any other 
context, which may be more reflective of kin presence than group size.  In the 
chimpanzee study, the authors investigated the acoustic properties of recruitment screams 
in wild chimpanzees, in which animals attempt to recruit aid during agonistic encounters.  
The authors found that victims of aggression would exaggerate their recruitment screams 
to make them seem as if they were receiving more severe aggression than what they are 
actually experiencing if there was a group member present whose rank either matched or 
surpassed the aggressor.  These two studies demonstrate evidence of naturally occurring 
and laboratory produced audience effects on primate behavior.   
  Perhaps one of the most interesting studies of audience effects was reported by 
Drea and Wallen (1999).  In this study, the authors wanted to test whether an individual’s 
audience affected its performance on a cognitive task.  A group of rhesus macaques was 
divided into two subgroups based on rank and trained to separate into the high ranking 
and low ranking groups for testing.  They were then trained on a simple discrimination 
task involving two sets of colored foraging boxes, in which one color (blue) contained a 
food reward of peanuts and the other color (red) contained similarly sized rocks.  Initially 
all animals were trained in a common testing arena, and during this time only the 
dominant animals seemed to successfully learn the discrimination task as they spent 
significantly more time than subordinates foraging at the baited blue boxes.   The next 
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two phases of the study involved testing animals in their subgroups split by rank.  First 
the animals were tested on the same task but using a new color scheme (baited yellow 
and non-baited green).  In the split condition, in which dominants only tested with other 
dominants and subordinates only tested with other subordinates, both groups 
demonstrated superior ability on the task by selectively foraging only at the correct 
yellow boxes.  The next phase involved split testing again, but this time using the original 
color scheme (red and blue), which the subordinate individuals initially seemed unable to 
perform accurately.  However, while split, both groups demonstrated the ability to 
correctly perform the task.  The final stage of the experiment involved recombining the 
groups and testing them using the yellow and green color scheme, on which both groups 
performed accurately while in the split conditions.  When both groups tested together, 
only the dominant animals demonstrated the ability to select the correct boxes, and the 
subordinates no longer performed correctly.  The authors concluded that the low status 
monkeys were purposefully “playing dumb” on the combined group task since they had 
already demonstrated the ability to perform the task in the split group condition.   
  A possible alternative explanation for Drea and Wallen’s (1999) results is that the 
dominant individuals were simply physically preventing subordinate individuals from 
accessing the baited boxes.  Although the authors did not witness any heavy aggression, 
there was significantly more threatening of individuals near the testing zone.  Further, 
although they report that dominant and subordinate subgroups received the same amount 
of threats, they did not report the pattern of threats.  Within each subgroup, there were 
three matrilines related through maternal kinship: a dominant, a mid-ranking, and a lower 
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ranking matriline.  Therefore, the relative rank of the different matrilines changed 
depending on the testing condition.  For example, the third ranking matriline in the 
dominant subgroup was dominant to approximately half the group under the combined 
conditions, but when testing in the split group condition, they ranked the lowest.  During 
the split testing condition, the highest ranking matriline in each subgroup gathered the 
most peanuts, but because the directionality of aggression was not reported, it is unclear 
if, or to what degree, the top matrilines threatened conspecifics during the various testing 
conditions.  The authors proposed that because monkeys were able to anticipate 
behavioral consequences, the subordinate individuals were purposefully inhibiting their 
behavior in order to avoid being punished for countermanding the dominance hierarchy 
(Drea and Wallen 1999).  However, it is still difficult to determine if the presence of 
dominant individuals caused subordinate individuals to “play dumb” because they were 
threatened away in the testing area, because they learned a simple stimulus-response 
contingency in which obtaining food in the presence of more dominant individuals 
resulted in physical aggression, or because the subordinates were purposefully 
withholding correct responses to avoid possible retribution.  
 Proposed Research 
  The goal of this study was to investigate the extent to which the mere presence of 
an audience affects the ability of tufted capuchins to perform a cognitive discrimination 
task.  A touch-screen computer was used to administer a shape-matching discrimination 
task under three social contexts: alone, with a subordinate audience, and with a dominant 
audience.  Unlike the Drea and Wallen (1999) study, individuals could not physically 
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interact during testing.  The audience was only seen and heard nearby in an adjacent 
compartment.  If individuals performed significantly lower with a dominant individual 
nearby and not the subordinate audience, that would seem to give support to Drea and 
Wallen’s (1999) explanation that subordinate animals willingly inhibit successful 
behavior in order to avoid transgressing hierarchical rules.  If individuals performed 
significantly worse in both social contexts, but not when alone, then the presence of any 
individual, regardless of its rank, might be acting as a distracting influence and lower 
performance.  Finally, if there were no significant differences in performance across 
social contexts, then that would seem to indicate that the capuchins are not subject to 
audience or distraction effects while performing a cognitive task.   
  I predicted that the tufted capuchins in this study would act similarly to the rhesus 
macaques reported in the Drea and Wallen (1999).  Dominance hierarchies in both 
species are similar in that they are linear and are determined by dyadic contests over food 
and space (Wheeler 2009; Drea & Wallen 1999).  Dominant individuals by definition 
should have first access to preferred food items because of an elevated status over 
subordinate individuals (de Waal 1986); subordinate capuchins might suppress correct 
performance in order to avoid breaking hierarchical rules that might encourage future 
punishment from dominant individuals.  On the other hand, capuchins are known to be a 
more socially tolerant species than rhesus macaques and this might influence audience 
effects(capuchins de Waal 1997; rhesus macaques Cooper & Bernstein 2008).  For 
example, de Waal (1997) demonstrated that capuchins regularly share food with both kin 
and non-kin group mates, while Maestripieri (2007) states that rhesus macaques do not 
24 
 
share food under any circumstance. Therefore, unlike the rhesus macaques of Drea and 
Wallen’s (1999) study, capuchins may not withhold behavior in the presence of dominant 
individuals.  
Methods 
 Subjects and Housing 
  Subjects were two adult male tufted capuchin monkeys housed in a colony of 
fourteen animals at Bucknell University’s Animal Behavior Laboratory.  The group was 
established from six animals acquired in 2000 and all individuals were born in captivity.  
Both animals had previous experience using touch screen computers to perform 
discrimination tasks.  They were used as subjects because they were the only two to reach 
a training criterion.  A training criterion was required because an animal needed to 
demonstrate some level of proficiency on the discrimination task before it could be tested 
for performance changes in the presence of different audiences.  Although the goal was to 
test more subjects, the alpha male Monet (Mt) and the subordinate adult male DaVinci 
(Dv) were the only two to reach the criterion.   
The group’s enclosure was constructed of plastic paneling and stainless steel 
welded-wire caging with linoleum floors covered with cedar chips. Compartments were 
furnished with perches, swings, and climbing structures to promote species-typical 
movement (Judge, Evans, and Vyas 2005).  Subjects were fed twice per day, once in the 
morning with standard monkey biscuits, fruit, and vegetables and once in the afternoon 
with canned primate diet, bread, peanuts, raisins, and a “snack,” such as popcorn or 
pretzels after the completion of testing.  Water was available ad libitum.  
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The entire enclosure consisted of 3 rooms with 15 interconnecting compartments 
(Figure 1).  Chambers were connected to each other by mesh-wire doors that could be 
manually operated from outside the caging to separate specific chambers.  Where 
chambers were interconnected by overhead tunnels, they could be blocked off by portable 
metal panels.   When not testing or serving as an audience, animals were moved to a 
room of the enclosure (“Room A” Figure 1) where they were completely visually 
occluded from the room where animals were tested (“Room C” Figure 1).  Subjects and 
audience members were trained to move into two compartments in Room C (labeled *1 
and *2 in Figure 1) for testing. Testing and audience chambers 1 and 2 measured 1.0 x 
2.3 x 2.4m and 1.65 x 2.3 x 2.4m respectively.  
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*  
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Figure 1. Diagram of the entire enclosure indicating two testing and audience chambers marked 
with an asterisks  
 
 Discrimination Task and Apparatus 
 The discrimination task was presented on a 15” Elo Touch Systems Model 
ET1525C-40WE-3 touch screen computer run on a Power Macintosh G3, both of which 
were placed on a rolling cart (Figure 2).  The apparatus was rolled up to the caging where 
a testing perch was 25cm from the screen, a comfortable distance for the subjects to reach. 
The PsyScope 1.2.5 software package (Cohen, Mac-Whinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) 
- Manually Operated Door   - Solid Metal Door 
- Interconnecting Overhead Tunnel  - Mesh Door 
*
 
*
 
Room A Room B Room C 
1.0 m 
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was used to present a simultaneous match-to-sample (MTS) task of all possible paired 
combinations of eight geometric shapes (e.g., circle, triangle).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The testing apparatus.  The touch screen faces the subject while the operating 
computer faces the experimenter.  
 
 
The task required that the animals first touch a sample stimulus.  When touched, 
the sample stimulus would make a “boing” sound indicating that it had been activated 
and two choice stimuli would appear beneath the sample stimulus (Figure 3).  If the 
subject then touched the matching stimulus, a “beep” sound would occur and a green box 
would surround the correct choice indicating that it had been selected.  The subject would 
then be given a preferred food reward by the experimenter and the next trial would begin 
after a 2 second intertrial interval (ITI). If the subject made the incorrect choice, no 
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reward was provided and the screen would go black for a 3 second time out before the 
next trial would begin.  A test session included 60 trials on the MTS task.  The sample 
stimulus, pairs of choice stimuli, and side of correct stimuli were all randomized by the 
software package.  Testing was grouped in blocks, in which a block consisted of a testing 
session in each of the three social contexts (alone, dominant audience, and subordinate 
audience).  Both subjects completed a minimum of three blocks.  The audience for one 
subject on any given day was independent of the other because each subject had a 
separate randomized order of audience context.  In order to ensure animals were aware of 
the task requirements, baseline training occurred prior to data collection.  An animal was 
considered to know how to perform the task if it performed above chance (39/60 trials 
determined by a binomial distribution) for two consecutive sessions.  These initial scores 
were used as a “baseline” score for later comparisons.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 a.        b. 
Figure 3. The match-to-sample task in which subjects touched the top sample (a) which made two 
choices appear (b). Subjects were then required to touch the matching choice to receive a reward. 
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 Testing Procedures 
  Testing occurred in the afternoon five days a week.  Each animal would only test 
in one audience condition per day.  Initially, all animals were moved out of the testing 
room into a room behind a visually occluding door (Room A Figure 1).  Subjects and 
their audience member were then moved back into the testing room (Room C Figure 1) 
by opening and closing interconnecting doors.  Animals were rewarded with a grape for 
moving into the proper chambers.  The order of testing for the two subjects was 
somewhat random in the sense that whichever subject or audience member separated first 
also dictated the first one tested.  For both subjects, the “subordinate” audience was one 
of the two lowest ranking females (Natalie or Delicious). For Dv, Mt served as the 
“dominant” audience; the alpha female (Sally) served as Mt’s “dominant” audience.  
  To begin testing, the test animal would be separated into their preferred testing 
chamber (DaVinci tested in room *1 while Monet preferred to test in room *2; see Figure 
1) while the audience member was moved to the adjacent compartment, where it could be 
both seen and heard through the interconnecting wire cage doorway.  While the animals 
could physically touch each other through the door, physical contact was limited as they 
could only fit a hand through, and could in no way physically prevent the other animal 
from performing the MTS task.  When both animals had consumed their grape reward for 
moving into the chamber, the testing apparatus would be rolled up to the caging and 
testing would commence.   
  Since the presence of another animal might influence the subjects’ willingness to 
test, latency was recorded from the time the apparatus was presented until the time the 
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subject pressed the sample stimulus.  Latencies between trials were also recorded to 
evaluate willingness to test.  Both latency measures were used to score when an animal 
was refusing to test.  An animal’s test session was terminated if it would not touch the 
touch screen for five consecutive minutes.      
  To minimize effects of the investigator presence on the animal’s performance, 
only one experimenter would administer rewards at the cage while all others stood or sat 
off to the far side of the room and silently record latency information.  Additionally, the 
investigator operating the testing apparatus was unable to see the choices on the subjects’ 
computer screen, so could not give any cues as to the correct choice.  Reward distribution 
was based on hearing the auditory cue given by the computer for a correct choice.  Once 
the test concluded, the animal was given a grape reward for completing the testing 
session and returned to the rest of the group. If an animal refused to test he was returned 
to the group with no grape reward.    
 Data Analysis  
  Correct and incorrect MTS choices and refusals to test were recorded for each 
session and grouped by social context. To test for differences across social conditions, a 
3x2 χ2 contingency table analysis was conducted with social context as one variable and 
trial outcomes (correct versus incorrect) as the second variable.  To determine if scores 
differed across the entire testing period, a 2x2 χ2 contingency table analysis was 
conducted with condition (baseline versus testing) as one variable and trial outcomes 
(correct versus incorrect) as the second variable.  It was important to measure this 
variable in order to determine if variations in task performance were due to audience 
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effects and not a general decline in performance over time.  The last two “alone” social 
context scores were used as a comparison to the last two baselines scores obtained prior 
to testing.  All tests were conducted with α set at p < .05.  
Results 
 Training 
  Although attempts were made to train seven subjects to perform the MTS task, 
only two subjects, DaVinci and Monet, were able to reach the performance criterion 
required to participate. Their performance on the MTS task was correct above chance 
level (39/60 trials) for two consecutive testing sessions as determined by a binomial 
distribution.  For both criterion sessions, Dv scored 57/60, while Mt scored 44/60 and 
49/60. All other animals failed to reach criterion after 5 months of training, and were not 
used as subjects.   
 Testing 
  Neither subject differed significantly in their MTS scores over the duration of the 
study when baseline scores were compared to the last two “alone” scores (Dv χ2 (1, n = 
120) = .42, p = .58; Mt χ2 (1, n = 120) = .02, p = .88; Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Comparison of performances between baseline and the end of the testing period. 
Error bars represent +/- one standard error.  
 
   Both subjects performed significantly above change across all audience 
conditions (Figure 5).  A Chi-squared analysis on each subject revealed no significant 
relationship between the number of trials correct and the social context of testing (Dv χ2 
(2, n = 540) = .324, p = .851; Mt χ2 (2, n = 180) = 1.713, p = .425).  The animals’ 
performance did not change across any social context.  
33 
 
 
Figure 5.  Subjects’ average scores across 60 trials in the different audience conditions. 
The dashed line indicates above chance performance. Error bars represent +/- one 
standard error.  
 
  Refusals to test were rare and only occurred on approximately 7% of possible 
testingsessions (N=3/41).  Further, there is no discernable pattern suggesting that certain 
audience conditions caused subjects to refuse (Figure 6).  Mt refused once in the 
“dominant” audience condition whereas Dv refused twice, once in the dominant 
condition and once in the control condition.  Latency to begin testing revealed no trend 
because, except for the rare cases when a  subject refused to test in which the latency was 
the maximum five minutes (300 sec), subjects  always began testing as soon as the 
apparatus was pushed up to the caging.  
Subject 
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Figure 6. Occurrences of refusals in the different social contexts combined across both 
subjects.  
Discussion 
  Results of this study indicated that capuchin monkeys were not subject to an 
audience effect while performing a cognitive task.  Regardless of the social condition 
under which they tested, the animals’ MTS discrimination scores were near identical 
(Figure 5).  These results contradict reports by Drea and Wallen (1999) that subordinate 
individuals purposefully suppress successful performance on a discrimination task in the 
presence of dominant individuals.  Further, it seems that capuchins are also not subject to 
additional distractions while testing with other individuals present since performance in 
the alone condition was no different than either social condition.  
  Dominant individuals were unable to physically prevent subordinate individuals 
from either performing the task or receiving a reward.  Additionally, subordinate 
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individuals ignored any threats they received and continued to test as if they were alone.  
Unlike the animals in the Drea and Wallen (1999) study, threats in this study could not 
result in physical aggression, at least during testing.  The lack of consequence for 
breaking hierarchy rules should then encourage subordinate individuals to test to the best 
of their ability in order to maximize the number of rewards received, especially if they 
were unable to monopolize preferred food items during times when no testing occurred.  
Although no dominant individuals engaged in physical aggression during testing, it is 
possible that animals may have waited until testing was over to punish the subordinate 
animals for receiving rewards in their presence, although this was not evaluated in the 
current study.  If punishments were a post hoc event, then one would expect that the 
animals would initially perform successfully but decline over the course of the testing 
period as a result of repeated punishments after successful performances.  This scenario is 
unlikely as the animals’ MTS performance did not change over time (Figure 4). 
  Another explanation for the differences in audience effect in this study versus the 
Drea and Wallen (1999) study may be attributed to possible differences in social 
tolerance between capuchins and rhesus macaques.  For example, de Waal (1997) 
demonstrated that because of high social tolerance and affiliative tendency, tufted 
capuchins willingly allow other individuals to take food in their presence.  In particular, 
male capuchins share food more willingly and are less discriminatory in what they expect 
in return from social partners.  In comparison, Schaub (1996) demonstrated that long-
tailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) have a tendency to engage in “spiteful” behavior, 
in that they specifically do not to share food items with non-relatives.  Rhesus macaques 
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are similar to long-tailed macaques in displaying low social tolerance.  Further, 
Maestripieri (2007) reports, with a high degree of certainty, that rhesus macaques never 
share food under any circumstances.  Further, there are possible social structure 
differences in punishment between macaques and capuchins.  For example, there is 
evidence that macaques engage in kin-oriented revenge systems (Aureli, Cozzolino, 
Cordischi, and Schucchi 1992), whereas no such system has been seen in capuchins.  It is 
very likely that the dominant individuals in Drea and Wallen’s (1999) study refused to 
allow subordinate individuals to attempt to perform the discrimination task.  Similarly, 
subordinate individuals in that same study may have been unwilling to try and succeed on 
the task knowing that they were very likely to be punished for attempting to perform or 
succeeding at the task because of the low social tolerance by their more dominant group 
mates.  In contrast, capuchins may not have evolved the cognitive capacity to anticipate 
such retribution if their society lacks the “revenge systems” seen in macaques.   
  Despite the small amount of subjects, results indicate that capuchins were not 
subject to the same audience effects suggested by Drea and Wallen (1999) in rhesus 
macaques.  Clearly, the presence of conspecifics had no noticeable effect on these two 
specific animals’ performances.  Results, however, may have been unique to these 
particular animals and the audiences chosen.  Different subjects with different 
combination of audiences may have shown an effect.  Regardless, the results ultimately 
imply that the most important factor in an audience effect is the imminence of physical 
harm, and not the mere presence of others.  The ability to physically harm subordinate 
individuals is the critical methodological difference between this study and the one 
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conducted by Drea and Wallen (1999).  The authors interpreted their results as rhesus 
macaques consciously aware of hierarchical rules and knowingly playing dumb to 
appease the dominant individuals in the hierarchy. I suggest that the rhesus macaques 
were “playing dumb” because they learned a simple stimulus-response contingency, in 
which peanut retrieval in the presence of dominant individuals resulted in physical harm.     
  Capuchins regularly engage in all aspects of the “social field” described by 
Tomasello and Call (1997).  They recognize conspecifics, predict the behavior of others, 
form long-term relationships with group mates, and recognize the relationships between 
others.  Their engagement in the social field allows capuchins to make decisions 
regarding how to act around other members of their group based on both the direct 
relationship they have with group mates, as well as their ability to anticipate the behavior 
of others based on past experience.  Because physical interaction was limited 
methodologically in this study, the capuchins had no motivation to engage in either self-
denying or deceptive behavior in which they hid their knowledge of correct task 
performance from dominant individuals.  Similar to capuchins in Wheeler’s (2009) study, 
where subordinate individuals used context specific false alarm calls to usurp food 
resources, capuchins in this study were maximizing available resources by performing 
correctly a majority of the time on the cognitive task.  However, in Wheeler’s study 
capuchins had to withhold behavior until the social context enabled them to be successful.  
In this study, subjects were rewarded most during this time of physical separation of the 
group because they could receive food rewards without any competition, and should 
therefore have always performed the task to the best of their ability in order to ensure the 
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most rewards possible.  Indeed, all animals in the group have observed conspecifics that 
have been separated for husbandry purposes.  They may have learned, via social learning, 
that separation from the group facilitates uncontested food resources.  
  Although capuchins in this study did not exhibit evidence of audience effects, 
there is evidence that they have the cognitive capacity to engage in such interactions.  For 
example, Brosnan and de Waal (2003) conducted a study on inequity aversion in 
capuchins.  Their study investigated origins for motivation to cooperate, and utilized a 
bartering task in which the monkeys exchanged tokens for food items with human 
experimenters.  In some trials, individuals would exchange tokens for the same food 
reward, while in others one would exchange tokens for  more preferred rewards (grapes) 
while the other individual traded for a less preferred food reward (cucumbers).  In 
conditions where the rewards were not equal, the monkeys were significantly more likely 
to delay the exchange or refuse to exchange at all.  Results indicated that capuchins are 
aware of what other individuals consumed, how they received those rewards, and made 
conscious decisions on participation based on comparing their own situation with others.  
The results reported by Brosnan and de Waal (2003) are relevant to the study here 
because they indicate that the capuchins in this study most likely had the cognitive 
capacity to assess the audience contexts while testing and made decisions based on their 
observations.  
  Just as I suggested that the rhesus macaques of Drea and Wallen’s (1999) study 
merely acted in response to a learned stimulus-response contingency, the capuchins in the 
present study most likely did not make complex decisions weighing the pros and cons of 
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testing correctly in varying social contexts.  Rather, individuals most likely learned that 
when separated from the rest of the group, regardless of who is watching, they were able 
to receive whatever rewards were offered free of any negative consequences.  Even 
though capuchins possess the ability to withhold their knowledge from others, or “play 
dumb” as Drea and Wallen suggest, the design of this study motivated subjects to exploit 
the available resources while they were free from harassment of their group mates and 
separate from the “social field” in general.  Different experimental designs may have 
produced a variety results depending on the degree to which animals had to directly or 
physically compete over the preferred rewards.  Therefore, we should be careful of 
interpreting poor cognitive performance in any primate, including humans, as the 
willingness to appease more dominant individuals, but rather that these subordinate 
individuals feel threatened into poorer performance.  
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